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According to Arthur Danto an object can only be looked at, whereas a work of art has to be acquired by studying it; and he adds: even if this happens without conscious effort (1991, 1992). Therefore it is not the work in itself but the active process of reception which is a constituting factor of art. Michail Bachtin coined the term “dialogicity” for literature and meant the implicit “variety of speech”, the polyphony of a text. The term can also be applied to the work of art, the work of art being understood according to Umberto Eco as an “open artwork”, which enters into an active dialogue with a concrete recipient. (cf. my explanations in vol. I). In the following I will give an account on a seminar which was conducted in the course of the Socrates project in the summer semester of 1998.

          The intention of this seminar was, to analyse the specific process of perception of art as a dialogue between the work of art and the recipient concerning its quality and influencing factors. A work of art is here understood as a visual offer with its own specific “language“ that communicates a visual and intellectual impulse if the recipient is ready and motivated to get involved with the offer. The thesis is that this “language“ does not only possess a material but also an immaterial aspect; the relevance of the immaterial aspect depends, similar to a sounding-board, on the aesthetic competence of the respective recipient. The aesthetic competence includes aspects like, e.g. readiness to observe and question, attention and interest, experience and openness, sensitivity and contextual knowledge. The examination of selected works of art and the process of perception that they initiate is to clarify what is comprised in “material“ and “immaterial“ language.

INTRODUCTION. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OBSERVER

          In this introduction - not so much as a demand but rather as a challenge - the attention is to be directed to the contribution of the observer. The aim was to create a sensitivity for the issue of the effect that a work of art has just in and out of itself and to what extent the observer contributes not only passively but actively, i.e. to what extent is he or she qualitatively involved. The starting point of the discussion was a quote from Lessing’s Laokoon oder Über die Grenzen der Malerei (1766, Stuttgart 1967, p.23): “Only that is fruitful what leaves room to the power of imagination. The more we see the more we must be able to add in our minds. The more we add in our minds the more we must imagine to see.“ A concise pose shown in a picture, if it corresponds with the experience of the percipient, can stimulate the imagination of the observer and the fantasy that foresees, and thinks and feels further; this use of the imagination is necessary if the pose is to have an effect, if it is to be understood.

          A passage of the novel Ein Gott der Frechheit by Sten Nadolny (Munic, Zurich 1994, pp. 89 f.) reads as follows: The god Hermes who suddenly is “thrown“ into the 20^th century encounters the picture “of a young woman, maybe a nymph like his mother Maia“ in a Venetian church. “She pleased him already for the mere fact that she was not in quite as sad a state as the other Gods now... She could be recognised by a stole wrapping her head and body and by a child in her arms. ... the stole was green with a golden hem and her son already relatively tall, he stood on her thigh, like the Dionysis-boy on the hip of Hermes, back in the olden days. She held him with her exquisitely beautiful hands and looked content, with a tiny smile. She was probably a witty story-teller who had just come up with a wild story about her little boy, telling it to the old men to her left and right. And they believed every word...“.

Because of his cultural experiences and influenced by his view which is lead by his interest (he is on the lookout for other gods), Hermes interprets the supply of pictures to comply with the intentions of patrons, artists and the intended audience. Having been raised in the European-Christian tradition, we recognise, in the illustration, the virgin Mary with the infant Jesus surrounded by adoring saints. Nadolny points out to us in which way our knowledge is projected onto the shown image and how it leads to interpretations, even of the inner state of emotion of the figure. Goethe had already realised: ”We do not see what we see, we only see what we know.”

          More radical even is the third quote of this introduction: “A work is only completed by those who look at it.“ (Marcel Duchamp, 1956, quoted in Dieter Daniel’s, Duchamps und die anderen. Cologne 1992, p.2). Consequently, the observer is not faced with a finished object that he or she perceives but through the process of a productive and active perception he or she takes part in the artistic process, takes part in the completion of the work of art - which also means that no offer of art is complete in itself, that there can be no general binding completion, since every process of perception has its own specific characteristics.

ORIGINALS IN THE PRODUCTION LINE. VISIT OF AN EXHIBITION

          It was a fortunate coincidence that during the same time the exhibition “Product: Art! Were is the original?!“ was shown in the museum Ludwig in Koblenz (Cat. Katharina Vatsella, Neues Museum Weserburg, Bremen 1997). She presented works of the ‘Edition MAT’ (Multiplication d’Art Transformable - Daniel Spoerri, Karl Gerstner, 1959 - 1965) as well as examples of contemporary serial art. After a short introduction and overview over the exhibition it was the individual task of the students to: choose one object; to closely observe it and analyse material, design, shape...; to draw the object; to take notes about associations, impressions, feelings, opinions, etc.; to observe the way of presentation. Due to the lack of time only a few of the objects could be presented in the group; based on the drawings and notes the presentation and discussion of the other objects was continued in the following class. A certain insecurity and helplessness could be observed. Is it art if not the artist but others produce something according to the artist’s instructions; if the content of a waste and paper basket that was accidentally found is put into a class container and presented; if objects that were found ready-made are being put together or installed? But: the presentation in an art-museum indicates the claim to art-quality (the thus perceived “label“ >art< seems to be an important element of the “language“ of the art of work).

Gerstner writes (in obvious correspondence to the introductory quotes): “An artist can not intend to make art. He draws up art, creates works... He then throws them - like it or not - in the purgatory of public opinion, i.e. of the most differing appreciation. Most of them are burning to ashes and the ashes are being swept away. Others, very few of them, walk out of it, purified, accepted and more or less freed from dissent, into the paradise of eternal values. That is the aura. And the labelling as a work of art.“ (Kat. p.53).

          The evaluation of the students in the seminar differed. The place of presentation as well as some well-known names of artists increased the readiness to observe more closely and seek acceptance and “artistic work.“ An intensive and detailed examination can lead to creative associations and attempts of interpretations... The discussion showed: the opinions, ideas, associations of others can change one’s own opinion, can provoke attempts of interpretation, can turn scepticism and resistance into (tentative) acceptance, can at least foster the readiness to examine (the productive dialogue).

          We decided to do a little case study. Three pictures (reproductions in the size of a postcard) should be shown to children: one (conventional) painting, one object (on a photo), one photo from a magazine. What we wanted to know: Which picture would (emotionally) please the most? Which picture is accepted as “art“? The survey was done among five to ten-year-old children. The result was clear: Preferences were evenly divided between all three pictures in regard to “beautiful“ emotions (subject, colour, atmosphere) or in regard to pleasing memories and desired objects (e.g. photo of a tropical beach). The attribute “art“ however, was only given to the replicate of the painting. Reasons: it is painted, it is old. The photography was not understood as an artistic work; the object was not considered to be a created, aesthetic object but a commodity; the painting however was considered as a “made picture“ - observable creative work and the function as a picture are obviously criteria for “art“ that are obtained (mediated) at an early age and the impression of the age reinforce these criteria.

LAOKOON. THE WORK AND ITS CONTEXT

          The aim of this sequence was to point out in which way material language (shaped material, form) is linked to the ideational context in regard to the aspects of recognition, and in regard to effect and evaluation. That the sculpture was considered art was not called into question (most of the participants of the seminary knew it from art prints, one student had seen it in the Vatican)

-          The exact description (the making sure and exchange of what one sees) as well as the reconstruction of the poses (physical “experience) showed how very much the described scene (as a “frozen“ moment of dramatic and turbulent happenings) and the inner emotions of the figures, their physical disposition (pain, fear...) can be observed and felt. The appreciation of the artist’s work referred to the technical qualities of the sculpture as well as to the quality of expression that obviously rouses the imagination and empathy towards the portrayed situation in the observer even if it is only shown on a reproduced photography (pic. see Vol. I), that is lacking essential elements of the original sculpture (material impression, size, plasticity) although the clear frontal view of the sculpture helps the quality of the reproduction.

-          To the material language the title of the work is being added: “Laokoon and his sons.“ Picture titles belong to a work of art. Klee, for whom picture titles were very important, qualified this however: ”The subtitles only point into a direction felt by me. It is left to the beholder to adopt it and to walk in my direction or to disapprove and try own directions.” However, picture titles are at all times, even if they do not originate from the artist, trends to direct reception. Here it is a matter of a reference to a myth.Those who have secondary knowledge of the myth of Laokoon do not only gain one more dimension of recognition (the placement of the figures in the overall process, identification with the figures), they also see the sculpture as an illustrating interpretation - in the choice of the moment, the dignified and athletic portrayal of the father and his mimics, and the sophisticated depiction of the sons. The observer is thereby involved into an evaluation of the tragic event, particularly into an evaluation of the preceding action of Laokoon (his warning about the wooden horse into which he flung his spear). This offer of interpretation becomes even more clear if the observer is able to compare the sculpture to other depictions of the myth (e.g. Guilio Romano or El Greco) and can thereby grasp its particularities.

-          The high amount of copies of the sculpture, particularly the caricatures of the 19^th and 20^th century illustrated that the event can be detached from the Laokoon narration; that the concise moment, that the quality of expression is effective as abstract and therefore open to many comparable scenes (the ‘Deutsche Michel’ is crushed by the forces of restoration (1848), John Bull is crushed by the taxes (1848), politicians are crushed by social problems... ).

-          Bernard Andreae (Laokoon und die Gründung Roms. Mainz 1988) sees the sculpture as a symbolic content with political intentions, for him it is more than a mere illustration of the myth. In his opinion the sculpture was manufactured in 139 BC in Pergamon, created as a gift to the Roman commander Scipio Africanus, the destroyer of Karthago. The Laokoon-group was supposed to symbolise the fall of Troja; Laokoon’s doing, that can be seen as a sacrifice for the foundation of Rome, was to promote their political good-will towards Pergamon, since Pergamon, just like Rome, claimed to have Aneas (who understood Laokoon’s warning and fled Troja) as founder and thought of itself as the risen Troja. According to this, the Laokoon group is not only to be read as an illustration of a myth but as a symbol of the destroyed city, as a  memorial and at the same time as an utopian reference to a new beginning. (It is interesting that the monument “The Destroyed City” by Ossip Zadkines in Rotterdam, 1947, shows a distinct reference to Laokoon)

-          The history of the perception of the Laokoon-group shows one more aspect of contextual meaning. In January 1506 the sculpture was rediscovered in a vault in Rome. Its finder as well as a group of experts (da Sangallo, his son and Michelangelo) sent by the pope who had been informed of the discovery, could immediately determine the group: based on their knowledge of a text by Plinius who had described it in the “Natuaralis Historica“ and judged it as preferable to all other works of art, sculptures as well as paintings. This antique judgement that was handed down had an influence on the contemplation and assessment of the sculpture. It also caused an unusual public interest, general popularity as well as a continuing discussion that stylised the sculpture as the ultimate work of art. The use of the Laokoon, e.g. as a motive for the advertisement of tourists with the aim of its ennoblement, witnesses to this judgement continuing to the present day. If Andreae (see above) is right, the marble sculpture is a replicate of the lost Hellenistic bronze original. Thus Plinius’ judgement does not refer to the sculpture as the best work of art but to the replicate that is preferable to all other replicates. It is therefore not the work of art that is admired but a replicate - which makes us think of the importance of the “original“ and its sole value as work of art in relative terms (referring to the MAT-exhibition).

-          When the sculpture was found, among other parts, the right arm of Laokoon was missing. In accordance with the taste of the time a stretched arm, adding emotiveness, was supplied. Even Winkelman sees this supplied work of art as a “a perfect work of art.“ Only in 1905 the original right arm was found and added to the sculpture in 1905. Thus, the aesthetic feeling of a time (that is, acquired and generally accepted criteria of taste) seem to be of great importance for the perception and judgement (it says something for Michelangelo’s sensitivity for forms that he had already sketched a bent arm but his suggestion was rejected).

          Summing it up it may be said that the example produces six aspects for an approach to the artwork’s immaterial language, which is one factor in the process of reception.

- The readable expression of the figures, which unleashes emotions and allows us to sympathise with them, respectively, and which points out the inner state of emotion of the figures.

- The title which gives reference to the literary content (here to the Laokoon myth).

- An interpretable, abstract statement (which disregarding the original content becomes virulent in after-images)

- The historical sociological-political context of the time of the origin of the work as well as the historically intended (by artists, by patrons) function; the sociological-political context of the recipient’s times, which has formed him, take effect in an equivalent way.

- the imparted, public assessment of the work and hence thereby related and imparted value judgements and art-theoretical positions held.

- the prevailing taste and the – at that time – relevant conception of art.

STILL LIFE. MIMESIS AND SYMBOLIC CONTENT

a)       The Vanitas still life by Peter Claesz (1634, pic. 1) was supposed to demonstrate that the material language of this work of art in itself (mimetic, accurate representation of form and material impression, modulations of light and shadows, virtuoso painted depiction) can convey the intended content (of the artist) only to a limited extent. To reach an understanding the recipient needs the immaterial language: the knowledge of the symbolism of specific elements (e.g. the burnt-down candle as a symbol for mortality); only then the recipient is capable of interpreting the fashioning (e.g. the combination of valuables and indication for its transitoriness) and the changes made by the artist (the figure of Jona who escapes the jaws of the monster and is not part of the original Nautilus-Goblet (compare to the photo of the goblet created in 1595)) concerning their content in a Christian sense (The idea of Vantitas, qualification of death through the promise of eternal life).

The example gives us ground to more closely deal with symbolic terms. Rudi Keller describes how signs are formed from the point of view of a new recipient (1955). He differentiates:

Symptom: The meaning of a sign is interpreted by means of causal deductions (example: blood count – hepatitis)

Icon: the meaning of a sign is interpreted by means of associative deductions (example: crossed cigarette – no smoking)

Symbol: The meaning of a sign is interpreted by means of applying conventional rules (example: red traffic lights – stop !)

Symptoms to icons: Whenever they are imitated in a communicative purpose (example: demonstratively yawning shows that a lecture is boring)

Icons to symbols: Whenever they are used often enough with the same goal – we have by now internalised the crossed cigarette

Symptoms become a metonymy on the level of symbols: e.g. according to the pars-pro-toto principle: 1000 keels are approaching the coast – ships are meant

Icons become metaphors on the level of symbols: e.g. Mr. Meier is the oak of the choral society – Oak: symbol of constancy – in reference to Mr. Meier.

If frequently used metonyms and metaphors use themselves off and become “lexicalised“.

          Used in an offer of pictures, they may either be automatically – so to speak – grasped or be failed to be noticed by the knowledgeable viewer or, respectively – cf. the example of Hermes - be wrongly categorised; wrongly according to the intended statement.

          Germaine Haas-Brossard describes this slightly differently: ”Because the symbol exceeds the bounds of the rational, discursive thinking fails when interpreting a symbol. The symbol will elude any precise definition, and an analysis will bereave the symbol of its value. The meaning of a symbol can only be learned by intuition and by a holistic approach. A symbol will stay without an effect on an indifferent viewer who is not willing to participate. Through the viewer’s persona, the times he lives in, his origins and his surroundings a subjective experience of truth is pre-determined. The symbol is ambiguous, changeable and dynamic. It points out a hidden meaning beyond itself.” (The language of symbols. In: die waage 1/1996)

          In addition to knowledge there is the imagination, the sensitiveness and the intuition of the viewer. Thus he can come closer to the intended symbolism but he can also take the picture and “secretise” symbols into it.

b)       In contrast to that Cézannes’s still life (pic. 2) does not contain such connected symbolisms. The depicted objects are not pointing to something but have a value by themselves; however the value is not contained in the objects themselves but lies in the specific way they are depicted; it rises in connection with the picture’s own value that is made up of the individual artistic trademark that it shows, of the specific composition and of the language of the form. Cézanne did not copy nature but as a creator he creates “parallel” to nature something of his own. However, the picture does not become articulate and comprehensible in its value (and artistic effort) until the informed recipient sees it in contrast to conventional portrayals (intended and excessive faithfulness to the object, uniform construction of perspectives) and thereby can grasp the subjective artistic interpretative work (form and rhythm as intellectual forces).

c)       At first sight even less mimetically connected with the object and autonomous as a picture, is the still life by Juan Gris (pic. 3). His language of the form, the clear structure… the acceptance of the two dimensions of the surface of the picture activate the sensitivity of the observer for the aesthetics of form and colours; slowly - in growing correspondence with the knowledge of the objects and their appearance that is stored in one’s memory - at first shadowy and then more clearly, glass and pitcher, bottle, pot with lid… emerge from the offer of colours and lines and from the fragments that can be identified. The offer of the picture activates a supplementing, deductive effort of perception and proves to be a painted “collage” - the syntheticising process can be comprehended by the percipient through observation.

d)       Morandi’s still life (pic. 4) that can be ascribed to his short phase of  “Pittura Metafisica” is closer to a mimetic depiction. However, the comprehensible causality of the combination of these objects as well as the original arrangement, the abstraction of the materiality of the objects and the coolness of the depiction strengthen the individual value of the picture as a made picture and urge the observer to desire to see “more” than the representation of the objects, urge him to look for symbolic values and for a hidden context. And yet the objects as well as their arrangement do not contain a conventional collocation - they are a riddle without solution, the offer of an irritating secret.

          On top of the offer contained in the material language, all still life carry somehow carry an immaterial “more” that provokes the knowledge and the emotions of the observer (internalised experience of observation or acquired knowledge of symbols), that provokes an active process of perception (combination, association; concluding of intuitive interpretation or interest in interpretation), and that provokes a fusion of cognition and emotion.

The examples should make clear that a knowledge about symbols, which was referred to by the artist  and known and interpreted as such by the viewer, can become part of the immaterial language of the artwork; but also that the actually given object is meant to be a statement and that it is not to be a mere reference to something that could be meant; and also that the symbolic association which is given i.e. suggested but which on no account refers to conventional rules but if at all to individually subjective rules, can challenge receptional activity and imagination. However necessary our knowledge may be in many cases, it is just as necessary to look at the material offer closely and uninfluenced and not to sacrifice the sense for phenomena in the Panofsky system for the senses and meaning of nature. This requires the recipient to have a thorough and conscious look which is for example fostered by own esthetical-practical experiences, by the ability to partially – on an intellectual basis – reconstruct the process of the creation of a piece of art (as Klee requires of viewers of his pictures). And maybe even just this causes the appropriate sensitiveness. This requires to be careful, not to apply knowledge precipitately, to be conscious of automated structures and expectations, to apply the “art of unlearning”, which Werner Hofmann drew attention to with reference to Reynolds and Klee and to withstand the “strange look”, as Horst Rumpf postulates. 

MAGRITTE: SEEING AND THINKING

          Magritte’s “Pipe-Picture” (pic. see Vol. I, in the course of examination supplemented by “Les Deux Mysteres.” 1966; “Ceci n’est pas une Pomme.” 1964; “La Cle des Songes.” 1930) served the intention to address the complexity of the correlation between sign, characteristics and what is described as well as the complexity of our perception (reference: Plato’s cave-parable (The State Book 7), thesis of the “Radikaler Konstruktivismus;” Concept-Art: Joseph Kosuth, One and Three Chairs, pic. see Vol. I).

                   “The understanding of a picture is a process with several levels. It reaches from the first eye-contact during the perception over the intellectual processing of the meaning of the pictures up to the memory of the details of the picture. During these phases not only the pictures with their colours, forms, light or movements determine the comprehension, the knowledge, the expectations, the goals and the inclinations of the observer are just as important.” (Dietrich Meutsch: Ein Bild sagt mehr als tausend Worte. Funkkolleg Medien und Kommunikation. Studienbrief 4. Tuebingen 1990, p. 45)

          Magritte: “To have an answer to the question“ What is the meaning of this picture?” would mean to make the MEANING, the IMPOSSIBLE similar to a possible idea. Whoever tried to answer it would only bestow one meaning on it. The observer has all possible freedom to see my pictures for what they are, by making an effort to think of the MEANING, i.e., to think of the IMPOSSIBLE - just like the inventor did. Magritte: “The feelings that we have while looking at the picture can neither be separated from the picture nor from ourselves. The feeling, the picture and we ourselves are united in our mystery.”

            “Instead of seeking for a more or less new and original way of painting and instead of inventing new techniques he (Magritte) preferred to get to the bottom of the matter and to use painting as an instrument for thinking and philosophical wisdom, as a means to knowledge that is inseparably connected with the mystery and the inexplicable… He was always and exclusively interested in thinking in pictures without preconceived ideas, without concepts, he was interested in thinking in an exclusively visual sphere that was still invigorated by the spirit and metaphysics (Marcel Paquet: Rene Magritte. Der sichtbare Gedanke. Cologne 1993, p. 84 f .)

          The ordinary and veristic depiction of the familiar trivial matter experiences in its perception an irritation through surprising, inexplicable, impossible combinations of pictural elements, of pictures and language (text in the picture, title of the picture). This material, reflected language of the picture is reversed, it proves itself to be a pretence, to be unreal; behind it the mystery can be felt but nor grasped. The (uncertain) process of seeing provokes a process of reflection that does not dissolve the irritation but makes it a central theme.

MARCEL DUCHAMP - READY MADES

          Just like Magritte, Duchamp is interested in reflection. He did not want “retinal” art. “I was interested in ideas, not only in visual results. Once again I wanted painting to embrace the cause of the intellect.” (Duchamp 1946) - entirely in the tradition of a Leonardo da Vinci to whom art was “cosa mentale”, i.e. a matter of the intellect.

          A game of thought: In a seminar-classroom, leaning at the wall there is a snow-shovel. An object of art? We could find it - virtuously painted - as an element of a still life of Claesz - but he would probably never have chosen the snow-shovel for a motive, since it is lacking any symbolic relation in context of his Vanitas-intention. This is different with Cézanne and Gris; for them the object has not really any importance as motive, it is only the cause not the goal. In Morandi’s metaphysical stage-world the snow-shovel can be imagined as an irritating element. That Morandi’s pipe is only an example is shown already through his apple-picture; the initiated process of reflection can also be carried by a snow-shovel: This is not a snow-shovel… A rule for the game: The snow-shovel does not serve as a motive of a drawing or a painting… but the shovel itself, the object is to be used. - It could be changed: through paint, through the adding of other elements that change it, e.g. into a figure; through valuable material and costly decor, via magnification (a huge snow-shovel a la Rauschenberg). It is noticeable: the snow-shovel can be considered a work of art when it appears as more than the mundane tool that was produced to shovel snow with it (pic. 5). Duchamp has - without making any change - presented the snow-shovel just as he bought it in a store as a work of art. This postulate cannot be conveyed through the snow-shovel itself but only in combination with a title (“In Advance of  a Broken Arm.” Duchamp: “The title was extremely important to me.”), through the presentation adequate for art (in a museum or gallery), through the context, the declaration: This is a work of art; through the acceptance of this declaration by others which becomes really crucial if the explaining artist, as well as those agreeing with him, are acknowledged by society and have the power to form opinions. (The order to not touch the snow-shovel because it is a - highly insured - work of art creates a distance and stresses its claim to be art. Reference: Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi: Kreativitaet. 1996, Stuttgart 1997, 496 ff. Der Beitrag des Feldes. The trained ritual of perception (adequate to a painting or a sculpture) of the observer of art replaces the mundane object and (potentially) opens it to different ways of perception and interpretation. However, many remain obstinate (refers to our study in our second sequence) - since Duchamp does without his act of production (that is considered artistic). He chooses an object, a “ready-made” and qualifies and presents it as a work of art (Duchamp’s quotes about the bike-wheel and the ready-mades taken from: Serge Stauffer, Marcel Duchamp. Interviews und Statements. Stuttgart 1991, p. 104, 120, 228).

            “Only the naming, this linguistic determination and classification in a context of art makes an object socially a work of art.” (Johannes Meinhardt, Kunstforum 131/94, 218).

OBJECT-ART

          In this sequence examples of objects of art are examined concerning their potential intention. The context of DADA as an ironic critical anti-art in opposition to the conventional “educational bourgeois” art and as a source of Surrealism is also taken into account (reference: Duchamp and DADA)

          Hausman’s Dada-head (pic. 6 and further slides that show the head from all sides); a found wooden head for wigs combines elements (the title “The Spirit of Our Times” points to the intention) that make the installation of the object appear as symbolical, i.e. that characterise the contemporary human being as a numbered and normed being that is subject to measurements (measuring-tape, ruler, clockwork mechanism), expectations, strife for money (purse), reproduction and the public (brass thread from a camera). The mundane character of the elements and their actual utilitarian function belong with their placement on top of the head to the “language” of this work, including their challenge to see them in their new function as the evaluative characterisation and interpretation of human beings. The actual process of perception is therefore a reflective process, initiated through the offer of the object; through this process of perception, conclusion, assignment and interpretation the criticism that becomes apparent through the comprehension of the process of installation is taken up, and the head that is understood as a mirrored  counterpart, is applied to oneself.

          Meret Oppenheim’s fur-coated cup is based on knowledge of the observer about what a cup is and what it is used for. The cup and its shape can be recognised and observed underneath the coat, that actually destroys the original function of the object because one would not drink out of that cup - the sensual-emotional impression, the imagined act of drinking out of that cup leads to an emotional rejection of this function. The cup has turned into an object of observation; the change (through the fury coat in contrast to the porcelain) leads to an estrangement (“Verfremdung” in accordance with Brecht) and thereby triggers off - as a provoking  game - other associations, feelings, evaluations than the cup that has a functional use in everyday-life.

          At first Picasso’s bull-head (pic. 7), shown by transparenty,  was partly covered by paper and only the bike-saddle was shown and after a close observation its form, material and function was recognised and named. The combination with the cradle of the bike, the vertical presentation (like a hunting-trophy on the wall), the similar shape lead to the association with the head of an animal that then was specified through the title and was comprehended and accepted by the students. The discovered elements - both from a bike - were combined in a way that as a unity they did not only loose their original function but also their characteristic value of shape and sign, they even lost their material value (it was realised that the saddle is made of leather, of animal-skin) and gained a new meaning - taking up Archimboldo’s method. The comprehension of the process of combination, the knowledge about the original meaning triggered off further associations and interpretations with some of the observers (cues: kinetic energy, bike-ride, the knowledge of the meaning of bull (and Menotaurus) and bull-fighting for Picasso intensified these associations).

          All three examples did not present - like Duchamp’s ready-mades - the objects as offer in the way they were found and chosen but the artists fashioned by making material changes through different methods and intentions, which then lead to different “immaterial” linguistic contributions. However they did not start with the found objects that had already been made; the artistic process of production is - in contrast to painting artists - reduced to finding/ choosing/ changing/ giving of the title. More important than the artistic effort is the idea, the originality, that shines through the material products.

          Something similar is shown through more recent works, where the creators more or less directly refer to Duchamp. Spoerri’s trap-pictures arrange left-overs and requisites of a meal as if they were left behind; they encourage the observer to not only think of and imagine the arrangement but also the events, the process of eating, drinking…Christo’s wrappings (related to Maurice Henry: Hommage a Paganini. 1936) leave room to guess the slightly estranged wrapped objects - similar to a transparent riddle - they are an impulse to activate the memory that is confirmed through the title. Broodhears (pic. see Vol. I) so to speak combines Duchamp (he uses real eggshells) and Magritte (“Moules” as yellow writing in the picture), however he irritates since “moules” means shells (and model) and on the other hand the yellow writing points to the eggs and eggs in a way  (as reproductive form) can be understood as model.Through his combination of chair, orange and blind’s man cane George Brecht (pic. 8) offers an impulse for a game, ambiguous and rich of associations although he never himself calls them work of art: “For me they are simply things that are standing around just like everything else. And they are research.” (Brecht in: Kuenstler. Kritisches Lexikon der Gegenwartskunst. Ed. 21. Munich 1993) In contrast to that Johns (pic. 9) fakes the real object; the beer-cans are made of bronze and are painted. Visually they do not differ from real beer-cans. Since they usually cannot be touched it is only the description of the object that conveys the quality of the “artistically made.” Merely the pedestal visually hints to a sculpture.The table of Fischli/ Weiss (pic. 10) is lacking this “art-specific” accent. They do arrange their working-table in some kind of tromp-l’oeil-art; visually the arrangement differs in no aspect from the assembly of the same real things. Only the weight and a closer examination of the material show that they are no ready-mades (Parkett 40/ 41/ 1994, p. 25 ff.). The objects are carved out of polyurethane and painted.The knowing perception is therefore a two-sided game of the mind that has the art of the idea of the ready-made for an object.

          All examples equally use everyday-objects that are familiar to the observer from his or her own experience, whose function he or she knows and that are here cut off. Through declaration and presentation and emphasised through material changes an other, an open offer is presented that ignores the original function; that provokes other questions, emotions, evaluations; that rouses expectations of an unnamed explanation, interpretation, intention and therefore uses the seeing only as an impulse for further reflection. ( Lit.-ref.: Heinz Ohff: Der Gegenstand als Kunstobjekt. Das Kunstobjekt als Gegenstand. In: Magazin Kunst 42? 1971, p. 2249 ff.; Willy Rötzler: Objekt-Kunst. Von Duchamp bis Kienholz. Cologne 1972)

PROVOKATEUR DUCHAMP: FOUNTAIN

          Duchamp’s urinal with the title “Fountain” (pic. see Vol. I) serves in this sequence as an extreme example for the examination of the material and immaterial language of the work of art. The case that observers do not know the everyday-function and analyse the form (there is one case known where this occurred at a girl’s high-school) is an exception. Form and material can please by themselves, however the object remains one that was industrially produced, that is intended for the man’s lavatory and that is functional; the completely identical urinals that belong to the same series are far from being considered art. In contrast to the “Maenneken Piss” (i.e. little peeing man) in Brussels that in its content corresponds with the activity of peeing, is a shaped sculpture on a fountain and is therefore traditionally accepted as product of art.

          What is it then that distinguishes the offer of art “Fountain” from the functional product urinal? Visible changes that were carried out by Duchamp and appear as material language, are the signature (R. Mutt 1917), the presentation (the backside lying on a pedestal - compare with the historical photo by Stieglitz for the journal 391), the place of presentation (not a sanitation shop-window, not a washroom - but an exhibition, museum - compare to a picture of Marcel Duchamp where he sits in front of the object in the Pasadena Art Museum, Los Angeles 1963), the giving of the title as information about the context. The gesture of exhibition is appropriate for art; the declaration of the object as a work of art conveys (as immaterial language) the respective receptive impulse. That the realisation of the gesture (the opportunity for exhibition) is a crucial factor of the artistic language, was made apparent by Duchamp in an ironic and provocative way: his object that he anonymously submitted to the committee of the “Society of Independent Artists” was rejected in 1917. It was only exhibited (and accepted) when Duchamp (who himself belonged to the board of the committee) became known as its originator. The (general) acceptance of Duchamp is transferred to the object and makes it possible (through the reaction of the recipient) that an “artistic aura” is bestowed on it.

Walter Grasskamp: “The intention of his (Duchamp’s) ready-mades was obviously not the extremely successful change of the concept of art but a new definition of the artist who creates art without producing it, merely by choosing the objects. In this gesture, that was strongly emphasised by Duchamp and that was celebrated as an attack on all conventions of art, its convention that is crucial to modern times is maintained: the ingenious potential of the artist who, so to speak, creates art by the laying on of hands, in some kind of negative aesthetics of production.” (Merkur 2/ 1998, p.101)

          The public acceptance or at least the readiness for the (public) acceptance of the offer of art and its discussion proves to be a crucial element that is immaterially added to the language of the work of art. The following exhibitions of the “Fountain”, the replicates that were authorised later on, the frequently published discourse but also the many paraphrases (among them Regula Maria Mueller, Leda. 1989; Sherrie Levine, Fountain (after Duchamp). 1991, bronze casting; K.H. Hoedicke, Der zerbrochene Krug.1991) mirror this acceptance; at the same time those who do grant acceptance enjoy a public reputation in the discourse about art. Only the postulated and accepted label “art” lets the observer assume that it is connected with an idea, with an artistic intention.

Kant: “Spirit, in its aesthetic meaning is the invigorating principle of the mind… Now I claim that this principle is nothing but the ability to present aesthetic ideas; what I understand by an aesthetic idea is the idea of the power of imagination that causes much reflection although no particular thought, i.e. term, can be adequate to it and therefore no language can fully grasp it and make it comprehensible.” (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1^st part, 1^st section, 2^nd book)

          The quote actually corresponds with the understanding gained above that the original, pragmatic function of a chosen object is isolated and dissolved and instead an open intention that cannot be exactly described is reconstructed. The object itself is (for Duchamp) an example but it is (as the replicates show) still of importance; without the conveyed artistic aura it remains an (everyday) object; that way however it provokes reflection, association, interpretation that do not remain immanent but combine the context of the history and theory of arts (Der Fall Richard Mutt, Verteidigung Duchamps in “The Blind Man”; Duchamp: Der kreative Akt.1957) among those observers who accept the offer. Prepared through the gesture, the objects seem like a relic “loaded” with an idea - and as it is the case with religious relics the visible object remains important but only as a signal for the essential, so that in the end it is unimportant if the relic is real or not as long as it conveys the intended impulse (see the objects, e.g. of Beuys, especially the “remains” of the Fluxus-action, see also the “Relics” of Patrick Raynaud).

          Beckmann’s postulate: “Art does serve recognition, not entertainment,” is verified (not only here) in the active and productive process of perception of an accepting and knowing recipient. His aesthetic competence (e.g. aesthetic experience, sensitivity, knowledge and appreciation) that is aroused, required and directed towards the offer of art combines ratio, intuition and emotion and is therefore part of the “quality of the picture.”

Danto: “The crucial point of interpretation is the artistic identification and that on the other hand determines which parts and characteristics of the respective object belong to the work of art into which the object is transfigured by interpretation. Thus the interpretation could be described as a function that forces a work of art on a material object….” (Arthur C. Danto, Die Wuerdigung und Interpretation von Kunstwerken. In: Die philosophische Entmuendigung der Kunst. Munich 1993, p. 54 ff., here: p.64)

THE ARTISTIC PROCESS AS A PERSONAL EXPERIMENT

          The seminar could not come to a conclusive, finished result but it could initiate a process of reflection and contribute aspects. The work of art as an offer combines the material and the immaterial language of art; material (offer of observance): fashioned material (let it be colour pigments, marble or found, chosen objects, while in the artistic process of production the material serves as a demanding imperious catalyst), form, colour, presentation; immaterial (emotional and intellectual offer): declaration, gesture of exhibition, aura, context (title, symbolic value, theoretical reference, Zeitgeist). The freedom of artistic language seems unlimited (up to extensive renunciation of material language in concept-art); however it remains dependent on the concrete process of perception - the facilitation of perception (dependent on the recipient as well as on the offer), the quality of perception (dependent on the offer and the competence of perception). Reduced to the material language the offer levels to an outward decoration; an idea, an artistic intention must become noticeable and interpretable.

Marcel Duchamp: “What I have in mind is that art might be good, bad or indifferent; however we have to call it art no matter what adjective we use; that thus bad art is art in the same sense as a bad feeling is still a feeling.” (Der kreative Akt. 1957)

Erasmus of Rotterdam: “One has a slate with a wretched scribble on it but considers it as a work of Apelles or Zeuxis and can not admire it enough; is he not happier than someone else who really bought with a lot of money a piece from the hands of these artists but does not feel as much pleasure in the course of it?” (Das Lob der Narrheit, 1509, quote Zurich 1987, p.100)

The quotes encourage to give a task:

Choose an “object” and change it into a work of art, i.e. develop, invent, produce opportunities and ways that allow others to perceive and, if possible, to accept the object that has been changed into a work of art according to your postulate.

          Before the seminar ended an offer of art was thus realised (others will be made during the break and are to be “tested” through different recipients like children, young people and adults) and was observed, described and interpreted mainly through participants of the seminar. We attempted to work like detectives (rule: we perceive and accept the offer): everything that could be perceived and associated was used as a clue for an interpretable intention. In difference to the detective there will be no unambiguous, “correct” solution, but only possible and certainly different solutions that yet can all be justified and understood through the “clues.” We were surprised how much interpreting fantasy was released! The aspect of quality was here excluded - the question that remains is whether a shaping that binds and makes the immaterial language perceptible and is an impulse for reflection and interpretation represents at the same time an element of artistic quality… (Literature: Richard Schindler, Das Geschaeft der Detektive. Kunstrezeption und Verbrechensaufklaerung. In: Das Kunstwerk 2/1990, p. 4 ff.)

(Translated by Kerstin Klein)  

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